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Abstract 
The success of an agent mediated e-market system lies in the 
underlying reputation management system to improve the quality 
of services in an information asymmetric e-market. Reputation 
provides an operatable metric for establishing trustworthiness 
between mutually unknown online entities. Reputation systems 
encourage honest behaviour and discourage malicious behaviour 
of participating agents in the e-market. A dynamic reputation 
model would provide virtually instantaneous knowledge about 
the changing e-market environment and would utilise Internets’ 
capacity for continuous interactivity for reputation computation. 
This paper proposes a dynamic reputation framework using 
reinforcement learning and fuzzy set theory that ensures 
judicious use of information sharing for inter-agent cooperation. 
This framework is sensitive to the changing parameters of e-
market like the value of transaction and the varying experience of 
agents with the purpose of improving inbuilt defense mechanism 
of the reputation system against various attacks so that e-market 
reaches  an equilibrium state and dishonest agents are weeded out 
of the market. 
Keywords: Reputation, Reinforcement Learning, Fuzzy 
attribute weights, e-market. 
1. Introduction 
With the growing popularity of e-commerce and amount of 
information on WEB, users expect automated techniques 
to assure the trustworthiness of information available on 
internet. Software agents offer a promise to change e-
commerce trading by helping internet traders to purchase 
products from online distributed resources based on their 
interests and preferences [16]. Assuring the trustworthiness 
of web products and services in such an environment 
where actual traders may never meet each other is a 
challenging task performed by reputation systems. 
Reputation systems have a high utility in those 
environments where entities are long lived, feedback about 
the current interactions is captured and distributed, and 
past feedback/experience guides buyer decisions [22]. 
These systems are oriented to develop trustworthiness or 
the degree to which one agent has confidence in another 
within the context of a given purpose or decision. 
The definition and meaning of reputation varies with 
applications and contexts.  From an objective view, 
reputation is expressed as “a quantity derived from the 
underlying social network which is globally visible to all 
members of the network” [25] or, “a perception that an 
agent has of another’s intentions and norms” [17]. 
Reputation and Trust are often used in complementary 
fashion as an agent expects positive outcomes when 
interacting with another agent that has a reputation for 
being trustworthy [8]. Some systems are described as trust 
systems as therein agents determine whether another agent 
will do what it says it will, whereas others are best 
described as reputation systems because therein agents 
compute and propagate their beliefs about other agents. 
The e-market environment in which these agents operate is 
generally open, that means agents can join or leave the 
marketplace at any time; uncertain, i.e. the true worth of a 
good can be judged only after its purchase; and un-trusted, 
that is the e-market comprises of honest and dishonest 
agents. The e-market is populated with self interested 
buyer and seller agents that try to maximise their 
respective gains. The e-market environment is itself 
dynamic in nature as it undergoes continuous changes with 
different agents joining and leaving the e-market at will. 
The power of a reputation system in an agent mediated e-
commerce can be realized to the optimum if different 
process models inherent to the e-transactions like deciding 
about pricing of goods, computing and distributing 
reputation of participants and selection of a seller for 
purchasing a good are also dynamic [29]. A truly dynamic 
model must be sensitive to the changing e-market 
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environment and must adapt to changing experience of 
buyer/seller agents with each transaction. Dynamic e-
market models would provide virtually instantaneous 
knowledge about the changing e-market environment and 
would utilise Internets’ capacity for continuous 
interactivity. Designing efficient and robust reputation 
systems that satisfy both the buyers as well as sellers is a 
challenge for the research community. 
The objective of this paper is to propose a framework for a 
dynamic reputation system that is sensitive to the changing 
parameters of the dynamic e-market environment like the 
experience of agents involved in transactions, value of a 
transaction and number of transactions between the same 
buyer-seller pair. In the proposed model, each of the 
individual process model of the dynamic reputation 
framework is itself dynamic as selection of a seller for 
buying a good depends on the changing experience 
between a buyer-seller pair; computing sellers’ reputation 
by a buyer depend on the experience of an agent in the e-
market, mutual experience of a buyer-seller pair and the 
value of transaction. Further, incorporating value of 
transaction in reputation computation affects the amount of 
reputation that is to be enhanced or reduced after each 
transaction. This makes the reward/penalty proportional to 
the size of the transaction in which honest/dishonest 
behavior is exhibited by seller agents, and negates any 
benefit of a Value Imbalance attack where a seller agent 
gains reputation by showing honesty for small value 
transactions and then cheats for a large value transaction. 
Making the reputation updation dependent on the 
experience of agents, by varying the weightage of 
individual experience and shared opinion from others, 
reduces the effect of Ballot Stuffing attack where a number 
of malicious agents artificially enhance or reduce the 
reputation of another agent. Also, by making the reputation 
updation sensitive to the fact that whether reputation is 
earned from a single buyer or multiple buyers minimizes 
the effect of collusion between a buyer-seller pair. The 
proposed framework employs judicious use of information 
sharing and thus reduces the associated cost by using 
effective inter-agent communication. 
The reputation computation strategy proposed in this paper 
uses reinforcement learning (RL) techniques which provide 
a general framework for sequential decision making 
problems [10]. RL deals with what an agent should do in 
every state that it can be and how to map situations to 
action, in order to maximize the long term reward. The 
learner must discover which actions yield the maximum 
reward by trying them. Sometimes, actions may affect not 
only the immediate reward, but also all subsequent 
rewards. Hence, trial-and-error search and delayed reward 
are the two most important distinguishing features of RL. 
In the proposed strategy, for purchasing a good, the buyer 
chooses a seller offering the highest expected value of the 
good i.e. good with highest expected utility for the buyer. 
Expected buyers’ requirement from a good constitutes 
buyers’ estimation of goods’ attributes and is subjective 
and fuzzy in nature. It is subjective as relative priority of 
attributes of a good would vary with each good and with 
each buyer.  It is fuzzy as generally buyers’ expectations of  
a particular attribute are specified in fuzzy terms like “low” 
or “high”. Similarly, a buyer has to map linguistic 
assessment of goods being offered by different sellers 
based on their attributes to the fuzzy scale. Hence this 
paper uses fuzzy set theory to allow a buyer agent to 
compute attribute weights of a good and to select a seller 
that offers the good with highest expected value. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Various 
reputation models from literature and in commercial use 
are introduced in section 2. Section 3 presents the 
proposed dynamic reputation framework. To address 
existing problems, section 4 illustrates the performance of 
the proposed system against known attacks. A case study is 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Work 
Reputation models are an important component of e-
market, help building trust and elicit cooperation among 
loosely connected and geographically dispersed economic 
agents [12]. A number of reputation models described in 
literature are discussed below. 
The evidential model [2, 3] for reputation computation 
assumes a distributed reputation environment and is based 
on Dampster Shafer Theory. An agent finds the 
trustworthiness of another agent [3] based on its direct 
interaction and testimonies of  other trustworthy agents. 
Some reputation models [21, 26] from literature employ 
reinforcement learning and are based on individual 
experience only. In reputation model for increasing user 
satisfaction [26], seller agents adjust the price and quality 
of goods to maximise their profit. A multi-facet reputation 
model [21] involves reputation computation of both buyer 
and seller agents using quality, price and delivery time of 
goods. But, these systems [21, 26] suffer heavily from re-
entry and multi-identity attacks as these use negative 
reputation and new sellers do not start from minimum 
reputation. 
TRAVOS [15] employs Bayesian probability analysis and 
computes trust of an agent by taking into account past 
experience between two agents, and in case of lack of past 
experience, this model utilizes the information collected 
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from third parties. To filter out unfair opinions, TRAVOS 
uses an endogenous approach to filter out unfair opinions. 
PeerTrust [19] is a reputation model that uses techniques 
for resilient reputation management against vulnerabilities 
like feedback sparsity and feedback manipulation. It talks 
about dynamism in electronic communities from the 
perspective of  honest and dishonest behaviour of actors. 
Reputation in Gregarious societies (REGRET) [16, 17] 
employs fuzzy rules to find reliability of witness agents 
based on their relationship with the target agent. REGRET 
is a multi-facet reputation mechanism that models the 
reliability of reputation based on the number of 
interactions of witness agents with the target agent. 
Another model  “Trunits” [24] is based on accumulation of 
trust units (trunits). A seller must possess sufficient number 
of trunits before executing a transaction. To engage in a 
transaction, seller  must risk a particular quantity of trunits 
which is put into an escrow with the market operator. After 
a transaction, if buyer is satisfied, seller gets more trunits, 
otherwise it loses risked ones. 
Broker assisting TRS [4] is a flexible model  based on 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) that employs 
backpropagation algorithm. Use of ANN helps to reduce 
noise data and supports incremental training, so each agent 
requests for information only from those having a similar 
reputation evaluation criterion. 
In Reputation Dynamics and Convergence [8], authors 
formalize the desiderata that from a dynamic systems’ 
perspective a reputation system should have the properties 
of Monotonicity and Accuracy. As an example of 
Monotonicity, agents  who provide high quality goods at 
low price should acquire better reputation and,  in systems 
with focus on Accuracy,  the buyer should quickly learn 
the accurate reputation value for the seller. The Dynamic 
Framework proposed in this paper incorporates 
Monotonicity as the process of seller selection and also 
updation of reputation are based on the presence of 
favourable goods’ attribute like low price and high quality. 
Further, a fraudulent seller is penalised immediately to 
keep the reputation estimate accurate.   
The P4P (Pervasive Platform for Privacy Preferences) [20] 
system concentrates on privacy control in case of e-
transactions. The paper acknowledges the property of e-
market environment being dynamic and, the need that the 
existing systems in this environment should also be 
dynamic. It emphasizes importance of reputation by 
allowing the clients, the freedom to not disclose personal 
data according to the level of reputation. 
A number of simple online reputation systems are in 
commercial use. eBay [14] is the most popular auction site 
that has feedback forum as a reputation system in which  
after each transaction, a  buyer rates a seller as positive, 
negative or neutral i.e. +1, -1 or 0 respectively. The 
reputation of a user is computed by subtracting total 
number of negative feedbacks from the total number of 
positive feedbacks obtained from distinct users [23].  
Amazon [13] is America’s largest online retailer where 
reviews include star ratings from 1 to 5 and a prose text. 
Average of all ratings is used to assign reputation.  
A limitation of the existing systems from literature [1, 3, 4, 
8, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21] is that, during the process of  
computing or updating of reputation values, these do not 
take into consideration the changing parameters of 
dynamic e-market environment like the varying experience 
of agents and the value of a transaction which make them 
vulnerable to different attacks. The proposed reputation 
framework incorporates value of a transaction in the 
strategy of reputation computation to remove the problem 
of Value Imbalance attack and, varies the weightage of 
individual and shared reputation components with 
changing experience of agents to minimise the effect of 
Ballot Stuffing attack. 
3. Dynamic Reputation System Framework 
Reputation systems are oriented to encourage trustworthy 
behaviour, increase user satisfaction and deter dishonest 
participants by providing means through which reputation 
could be computed and disseminated [22]. The e-market 
environment in which reputation systems operate is 
dynamic as it changes continuously in terms of agents 
freely entering/exiting the market and also with the varying 
experience of agents. Therefore, as a buyer gains 
experience of a sellers’ behaviour with each repeated 
transaction, the weightage of the individual experience of a 
buyer-seller pair should increase as compared to the 
opinion shared by other buyer agents. Moreover, economic 
worth of being honest or dishonest in a transaction cannot 
be judged without taking into account the value of a 
transaction as honest behaviour in a large transaction is 
more important than in a small transaction.  
A dynamic reputation framework should base the 
reputation computation methodology itself on the 
dynamics of the e-market environment to infuse some 
inbuilt defense capability against possible attacks. In order 
to have a robust and high utility reputation system, 
different activities belonging to reputation computation 
methodology it should be adaptive to the changing 
environment and the experience of agents involved in a 
transaction. The next section describes the proposed 
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dynamic reputation computation strategy that employs 
reinforcement learning and fuzzy set theory. 
3.1 Buyers’ Strategy for Reputation Computation  
The proposed buyers’ strategy is based on the e-market 
model having a set of buyers and sellers. In this model, 
sellers are divided into four categories, namely, reputed, 
non-reputed, dis-reputed and new sellers. The reputation of 
seller s being computed by buyer b is composed of two 
components: individual reputation and shared reputation. 
These two components are combined to represent overall 
reputation of a seller agent.  
In this model, B represents the set of buyers, S represents 
the set of sellers and, G the set of goods. Let  [0,1) 
represents individual reputation (IR) component, 
 [0,1) represents shared reputation (SR) i.e. the 
opinion of other buyers for seller s, and  [0,1) 
represents overall reputation of seller s at time t, for the 
buyer b. At time t+1, buyer b stores/remembers the overall 
reputation  of all sellers , with whom buyer b 
has interacted at time t in the past. Each buyer maintains 
four categories of sellers as defined below. 
(i)   :  Sellers in the reputed list of buyer b, i.e. 
, where  ,  is the reputation 
threshold of buyer b and   . 
 
(ii)  :  Sellers in the non-reputed list of buyer b, i.e. 
 where  . 
 
(iii)  :  Sellers in the dis-reputed list of buyer b, i.e.  
, where  ,  is the dis-
reputation threshold and . 
 
(iv)  : Sellers that are new to buyer b in the market, 
initially  A new seller s remains in this 
list until its reputation crosses the dis-reputation 
threshold . Before crossing , if a seller cheats 
than it is moved to the list of dis-reputed sellers  
and is never considered again for business. 
The process of choosing a seller for purchasing a good 
based on its expected value uses three important algebraic 
operations on fuzzy numbers: inverse, addition and multi-
plication. If  and   
are two positive trapezoidal fuzzy numbers then, the fuzzy 
addition of  and  is given in (1) and inverse of a fuzzy 
number  represented as  is shown in (2) below. 
             (1)     
                           (2) 
Unlike addition and subtraction, product of two trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers may not result into a trapezoidal number  
[6, 7]. Therefore, this paper uses an approximation of the 
product of two trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to a new 
trapezoidal fuzzy number [7]. The product of two 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, A and B given above is 
approximated by the trapezoidal fuzzy number   
 as proposed in [6, 7] where, 
        
               ,    
       , 
        , 
        
                                             (3) 
For defuzzifying, Centre Of Area (COA) or Centroid 
method is used. For a fuzzy number , its 
COA is computed as: .  
The proposed reputation computation methodology based 
on the concept of reinforcement learning and fuzzy set 
theory is divided into three phases. In Phase I, a buyer 
expresses its willingness to buy a good and the set of 
sellers’ who respond for selling that good are elicited and a 
seller selection methodology using fuzzy arithmetic is 
applied to select a seller for purchasing that good. Phase II 
includes reputation computation using reinforcement 
learning. It begins after purchasing the good, where the 
buyer updates the sellers’ reputation based on the 
experience of the current transaction and the opinion from 
others. Finally in Phase III, the buyer updates its list of 
reputed, non-reputed, dis-reputed and new sellers. A 
detailed description of this methodology divided into 
Phase I, Phase II and Phase III is given below. 
Phase I:  
1. The process of buying and selling starts with a buyer b 
announcing the need  to buy a good g by sending 
broadcast request to all sellers. Those sellers who are 
willing to sell good g respond by submitting their bids. 
At any given time, buyer b preferably purchases a 
good from a reputed seller.  If no seller from the 
reputed list offers good g then the buyer b selects a 
seller from the set of non-reputed sellers but in no case 
the buyer would choose a dis-reputed seller [27]. In 
addition, with a small probability ρ, buyer b would 
choose a seller from the list of new sellers’ i.e. . 
Initially the value of ρ is 1 and it decreases over time 
to some minimum value defined by buyer b. 
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2. After receiving sellers’ bids for good g, buyer b first 
computes the expected value  of good g’s offer 
from each seller and then selects a seller s that is 
offering good g with highest expected value i.e. max. 
 based on the following strategy by computing 
goods’ attribute weights using extent analysis method 
[5, 28]  and combining it with fuzzy AHP technique.  
 
i.  Obtain the buyers’ assessment of pairwise 
comparison of different attributes of a good in 
linguistic terms like Equally important (E), 
Moderately Important (M), Highly Important (H), 
Very Highly Important (VH) or Extremely 
Important (EI) as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
   
 
 
Fig. 1  Fuzzy Scale for Relative Importance of  Attributes 
 
Using fuzzy scale of Fig. 1, map these linguistic 
terms to trapezoidal fuzzy values. For example, 
Highly Important (H) is mapped to trapezoidal 
fuzzy number  (3,5,5,7). 
 
ii. Compute subjective fuzzy weights of different 
attributes of good g from the buyer’s perspective by 
combining extent analysis method [5] with fuzzy 
AHP. Let  (Fuzzy Pairwise Matrix) represents 
the fuzzy reciprocal n x n matrix representing all 
pairwise comparisons  for all  as 
illustrated in Eq (4) below.  
 
   (4)                     
 
Where  and all  and their inverse  
are trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The subjective 
weight computation of attribute  denoted as  
is given in Eq. (5).  
 
        (5)                        
 
Further, compute  for i = 1,2 ..., n, i.e. for all 
attributes of a good represented by  is shown in 
Eq. (6).  
 
                            (6)  
                                                   
iii. Compute the empirical weight component , i.e. 
the average of fuzzy weight of each attribute, for i = 
1, 2,..., n, in a maximum of k number of previous 
transactions by the same buyer for the same good 
represented by  below. 
 
                                (7)                                                         
 
iv. Obtain the overall fuzzy attribute weight  of a 
good by using Eq. (8) given below. 
             (8) 
Similarly, compute  for i = 1,2,..,n, represented 
by  as shown in Eq. (9). 
 
                                  (9) 
 
In Eq. (8), the value of δ is zero in the case of a 
buyer purchasing a good for the first time. With 
each subsequent purchase of the same good by a 
buyer, the value of δ increases by a small fraction. 
This ensures that initially when a buyer has no 
experience of buying a good, the overall weight of a 
goods’ attributes depends only on subjective weight 
component of each attribute of the good i.e., . 
As buyer gains experience by buying a good 
repeatedly, the importance of its empirical weight 
component i.e.   increases and the importance 
of subjective weight component i.e.  decreases 
proportionately. This means that after participating 
in sufficiently large number of transactions, say k 
=100 transactions for an δ increment rate of 0.01, 
by the same buyer for a particular good, it is not 
necessary for a buyer to incur the overhead of 
computing the subjective weights of the goods’ 
attributes and instead utilise the previous 
transactions weight information.     
 
v. Solicit the buyers’ assessment of each seller’s offer 
for the good in linguistic terms like Poor (P), 
Average (A), High(H), Very High (VH) or 
Excellent (EX) based on trapezoidal fuzzy scale of 
Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2  Fuzzy Scale for Linguistic Performance of Sellers 
 
vi. Using fuzzy scale of Fig. 2, map these linguistic 
terms into fuzzy performance ratings of good g’s 
offers by different sellers. Let  represents fuzzy 
performance ratings of seller i for attribute j. Fuzzy 
performance of each seller i, for i = 1,2..,m and for 
each attribute j, for j = 1,2,..,n is represented by 
fuzzy attribute performance matrix  in Eq. (10).  
 
        (10)                                   
 
As per Fig. 3, if seller 1’s goods’ performance for 
attribute 2 is “VH” then its fuzzy performance 
rating as per Eq. (10) is . 
 
vii. Compute the fuzzy value of the seller i’s good 
as: . The fuzzy value 
matrix of each seller i’s good, for i = 1, 2, ..., m 
represented by   is shown in Eq. (11) below. 
 
(11)     
               
viii. viii. Perform defuzzification on the fuzzy matrix  to 
obtain crisp value matrix CVS using Centre of Area 
approach (COA). CVS contains the crisp expected 
value i.e. of good g’s offer from each 
seller. 
 
ix. Select the seller s with the highest crisp expected 
value i.e. max.  of the good g for placing 
purchase order for the good g.  
Phase II: 
3. Once the buyer receives a good after purchase, it 
computes the actual value of that good i.e. , 
reflecting whether the received good is satisfactory or 
not as per the buyers’ assessment of the actual good by 
again using step 2 of Phase I.  
4. After computing the actual value of a good, buyer 
updates the individual reputation of seller by first 
computing the difference between the actual value and 
the expected value of the good as given in Eq. (12) 
below. 
Δ =                      (12) 
5. If   Δ > 0, then using reinforcement learning technique, 
buyer b updates reputation of the seller s at time t+1 i.e. 
  with a value greater than its current value as 
shown in Eq. (13) below. 
         (13)                                                                                             
Where μ represents effective reputation value increase 
factor as shown in Eq. (14).  
                                                (14) 
and,                                      (15)                                                  
Eq. (15) is used to map the value of a transaction x in 
the range from 0 to 1 which in case of a single good 
being purchased is equal to the price p of the good g. 
Also λ is a constant in the range 0 to 1, and e is a 
constant with a value of 1.01. The function to compute 
η in Eq. (15) ensures that the value of μ in Eq. (14) and 
hence the reputation  increases monotonically 
with the value of transaction. In Eq. (14), β is a 
constant with initial value 0 and its value increases by a 
small factor, say 0.001, with each successive 
transaction between the same buyer seller pair. This 
ensures that with increase in mutual experience of a 
buyer-seller pair, reputation value i.e.  increases 
at a relatively smaller rate for the same value 
transaction according to the convention that reputation 
earned from different buyers is more important than the 
reputation earned from large number of repeated 
transactions with the same buyer as shown in Table 1 
below.  
Table 1: Monotonic Increase of Reputation with value of transaction 
but discounted with increase in number of transactions between the 
same buyer-seller pair (For  previous reputation i.e.  = 0.37) 
Value of 
Transaction   
(x) 
For  β = 0 For β = 0.5 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase 
 in 
Reputation 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase  
 in 
 Reputation 
100 0.001 0.371 0.169 0.0007 0.37 0.113 
500 0.005 0.373  0.845 0.003 0.372 0.563 
2000 0.02 0.3824  3.355 0.013 0.378 2.237 
5000 0.049 0.401 8.264 0.032 0.39 5.509 
10000 0.095 0.4297 16.127 0.063 0.4098 10.751 
20000 0.18 0.4837 30.726 0.12 0.446 20.484 
It can also be observed from Eq. (13) that individual 
reputation at time t+1 is based on overall reputation at 
time t to impress upon the fact that in the next 
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transaction, the overall reputation of a seller computed 
by a buyer at the end of previous transaction becomes 
the individual experience of that buyer agent. On 
comparing the relative increase in percentage of 
reputation in case of a buyer-seller pair having no 
previous transaction represented by β = 0 and after 
gaining experience of 500 transactions represented by β 
= 0.5, it is found that relative increase in reputation is 
less in case of  β = 0.5 as compared to the situation 
where β = 0 as illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3  Monotonic increase of reputation with value of  transaction 
but this increase is discounted/reduced with increase in number of 
transactions between the same buyer-seller pair to minimise the 
effect of collusion between a particular buyer and seller 
6. If Δ < 0, which represents the fact that the purchased 
good g has not been satisfactory as per buyer b’s 
assessment, then using reinforcement learning, buyer b 
updates the reputation of the seller s at time t+1 i.e. 
 by a value less than its current value as 
described by Eq. (16). 
         (16)                                                
Where ξ represents effective reputation value decrease 
factor due to unsatisfactory or dishonest behaviour of a 
seller agent and is illustrated in Eq. (17) below.  
                                              (17) 
Where γ is the Penalty Factor and value of γ is kept 
greater than 1 to ensure that reputation decreases at a 
faster pace as compared to the rate of its increase. This 
property is based on the convention that reputation is 
difficult to build but easy to tear down. The underlying 
purpose is to discourage dishonest behavior of seller 
agents in e-market by slapping a higher penalty on 
fraudulent sellers. Like μ,  ξ is also dependent on the 
value of a transaction and the number of past 
transactions between a particular buyer-seller pair. 
Hence there is steep reputation drop for a large value 
transaction as compared to a small value transaction as 
described in Table 2.  
Table 2: Monotonic Decrease of Reputation with value of a 
transaction but discounted  with increase in number of transactions 
between the same buyer-seller (Previous reputation,  = 0.37) 
Value of 
Transaction   
(x) 
For  β = 0, γ = 2 For β = 0.5,  γ = 2 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase 
in 
Reputation 
μ 
Updated 
Reputa-
tion 
% increase 
in 
Reputation 
100 0.002 0.3687 -0.339 0.0013 0.3692 -0.226 
500 0.01 0.3637 -1.69 0.006 0.3658 -1.127 
2000 0.039 0.3452 -6.71 0.026 0.3534 -4.473 
5000 0.097 0.3088 -16.53 0.064 0.3292 -11.02 
10000 0.189 0.2507 -32.25 0.126 0.2904 -21.5 
20000 0.361 0.1426 -61.45 0.24 0.2184 -40.97 
The use of the penalty factor γ = 2 applied during 
reputation computation ensures that the reputation 
drops at twice the rate as compared to the 
corresponding rate of its increase for the same value 
transaction. Comparison of relative increase and 
decrease in reputation corresponding to the changes in 
the value of transaction and number of transactions 
between a particular buyer-seller pair is shown in Fig. 4 
below.  
 
 
Fig. 4   Reputation drops faster than its increase                                     
to discourage  dishonest sellers 
7. After computing the individual reputation of a seller, 
this model combines it with the shared reputation about 
the seller s from other buyers to compute the overall 
reputation of the seller agent s. The equation to 
compute overall reputation function   is given 
below in Eq. (18).  
 
  (18)                                                                                                                                                
Where  is the individual reputation of seller s 
that is computed by the buyer b itself and  is 
the aggregate of the reputation rating of seller s that is 
received from other buyer agents. Further, α is the 
experience gain factor and . The initial value 
of α before the first transaction between a buyer-seller 
pair is 0 and with each successive transaction, it is 
incremented by a small factor of  say 0.01 to ensure 
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that with each successive transaction between a buyer-
seller pair, relative weight of Individual Reputation 
(IR) component i.e.   increases and that of 
Shared Reputation (SR) component i.e.  
decreases. This implements the dynamic property that 
with increasing mutual transactional experience, a 
particular buyer-seller pair would depend more on their 
past mutual experience and less on the opinion from 
other agents. The actual rate at which the value of α 
should increase depends on the good to be purchased 
and is to be decided by domain experts. After 
sufficiently large number of transactions, as value of α 
approaches 1,  would depend only on  
and the weightage of  would effectively 
become zero. This ensures that initially when a buyer 
agent has no experience of a seller, its dependence is 
greater on the opinion from other buyers although it 
means incurring some communication overhead. Once 
a buyer gains sufficient experience of past transactions 
with a particular buyer, it can avoid the overhead of 
inter-agent communication as the computation of 
overall reputation depends only on the individual 
reputation component. Hence, this framework employs 
judicious use of information sharing and thus reduces 
its cost with effective inter-agent communication.    
If a seller is new to a buyer b i.e.   then, 
                         (19)                                              
And, if a seller is new in the marketplace, i.e. 
  then, 
                                     (20)                                                               
Phase III: 
8. Finally, on the basis of the overall reputation rating of a 
seller s, sets of reputed, non-reputed, dis-reputed and 
new sellers i.e. SR, SNR, SDR and SNewR are updated as: 
If s is not a reputed seller, and , then 
  .                               (21)    
If s is a reputed seller, and  , then 
  .                               (22)                                    
If s is not a dis-reputed seller, and , then 
  .                               (23) 
If s is not  non-reputed, and  ,  
 .                              (24)               
 Finally, if s is a new seller, and, if , then 
  .                        (25)   
To summarize, the main functions of dynamic reputation 
framework are illustrated using flowcharts in Fig. 5   and 
Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 5  Dynamic Reputation Framework for Reputation System 
The flowchart summarizing the algorithm of seller 
selection strategy for computing expected/actual value a 
product is given in  Fig. 6 ahead. 
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Fig. 6  Seller Selection Strategy (SSS) for computing                     
expected / actual value of a good 
4. Common Attacks and Proposed Defense 
Reputation systems are different from general trust based 
systems in a way that they include self interested actors or 
agents who cheat and effectively launch various attacks to 
defeat these systems. The impact of attacks against 
reputation systems is much more than the manipulation of 
reputation values as these result into money fraudulently 
lost and ruined business reputations. This section discusses 
different type of  attacks classified in literature [2, 3, 18, 
22, 24] and presents a comparative performance analysis 
of the defense capability of the proposed system against 
these attacks. 
In Ballot Stuffing (BS), a group of agents collude to rate a 
particular agent with abnormally high ratings, whereas in 
Badmouthing (BM) an agent is rated abnormally low. In 
this attack, colluding agents participate in events that lead 
to allocation of reputation or feedback about that agent.  
Re-ENtry (REN) is an attack where a low rated agent exits 
the market and re-enters with a new identity. This attack is 
facilitated by the availability of cheap pseudonyms in the 
online environment. The reputation systems with negative 
feedback are especially vulnerable to REN. 
An attack in which two agents mutually rate each other 
with abnormally high ratings is called RECiprocity (REC) 
whereas in RETaliation (RET) both the agents rate each 
other with abnormally low ratings. 
Reputation-Lag (RL) takes advantage of the lag i.e. time 
gap, before cheating results in reduced reputation. During 
this period, an agent gets unlimited opportunities to cheat 
before other agents become aware of its loss of reputation 
due to malicious behaviour. 
In Value-IMbalance (VIM) attack, reputation earned or 
lost during a transaction is not related to value of a 
transaction. The effect of showing honest behaviour by 
selling a large number of high quality but low value goods 
and, dishonest behaviour by selling a small number of low 
quality but high value goods does not result into any 
significant loss in reputation score. This helps a malicious 
seller who behaves honestly for small transactions to gain 
reputation and then cheats in large transactions. 
If a seller agent has no further utility of good reputation, it 
utilises its entire reputation to cheat and exits from e-
market. This attack is called Sudden-Exit (SE). 
In Multiple-Identity (MI) or Sybil Attack, a seller is able to 
open multiple accounts thereby increasing its probability to 
sell a good. It continues selling the goods honestly through 
some and dishonestly through others without facing any 
significant penalty. It exits from the account with a low 
reputation and opens another account.  
Sometimes, a number of attackers employ a combination of 
strategies to launch a multifaceted and coordinated attack. 
This is known as Orchestrated (ORC) attack [18]. 
Attackers change their behaviour overtime and divide 
themselves into sub-groups where each group plays a 
different role at different time.  
4.1 Comparative Performance Analysis 
Reputation systems seek to generate an accurate 
assessment of participants’ behaviour in potentially 
adversarial environments [18]. In uncertain and un-trusted 
agent based environment of e-market, where the actual 
buyers and sellers may never meet, absence of such 
systems may lead to rampant cheating, fraud, mistrust and 
eventual system failure. Hence, the success of a reputation 
system is measured by the accuracy of computed 
reputation that predicts the quality of future interactions in 
an environment where a participant may try to exploit the 
system to its own advantage. This section highlights the 
performance of dynamic reputation framework based on its 
relative strength as compared to other models from the 
literature in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Qualitative analysis of Dynamic Reputation System (DRS)                                                                          
based on known attacks/problems and defense mechanisms 
Type of 
Attack / 
Problem 
Defense Mechanisms in 
proposed Dynamic Reputation 
Framework 
Defense 
Mechanisms in  
Other Models 
Value 
Imbalance 
(VIM) 
VIM is resolved as the amount 
of change in reputation is 
monotonically related to the 
value of a transaction. 
No model except 
Truntis deals with 
this problem. 
Reputation 
Lag  (RL) 
RL is reduced as with increase 
in the mutual experience of a 
buyer-seller pair, weightage of 
shared reputation reduces and 
finally becomes negligible after 
large number of transactions. 
Models based only 
on individual repu-
tation [21, 24, 26] 
do not suffer from 
RL, other models  
have no solution.     
Reciprocity 
(REC) and 
Retaliation 
(RET) 
Its effect is minimised  as 
reputation earned by a seller in 
lieu of repeated transactions 
with the same buyer is 
discounted with each successive 
transaction. Effect of REC/RET 
is also limited by the value of 
transaction. 
Commercial 
models like eBay  
have a strong 
presence of this 
attack as 98% of 
the eBay ratings 
are positive due to 
the fear of RET. 
Re-entry 
(REN) 
REN attack is partially resolved 
as to re-enter, an agent must 
lose existing reputation and re-
start with minimum reputation. 
e-Bay and Truntis 
deal with this 
problem with 
partial success. 
Sudden Exit 
(SE) 
Probability of SE attack is 
reduced. As reputation earned is 
proportional to value of 
transaction, so to cheat and exit 
from e- market, an agent has to 
first earn sufficient reputation 
by being honest for both large 
value and large number of tran-
sactions. Losing hard earned 
reputation is not viable unless 
transaction value is very high. 
No feasible 
solution in any of 
the proposed 
model so far. 
Multiple-
Identity (MI) 
No inbuilt feasible solution. 
No feasible 
solution provided. 
Ballot 
Stuffing 
(BS)/ 
Bad-
mouthing 
(BM) 
The effect of BS/BM reduces 
with each successive transaction 
between a buyer-seller pair as 
weightage of shared reputation 
decreases and becomes 
negligible when an agent gains 
sufficient experience of other 
trader agent. 
Evidential model, 
TRAVOS, 
REGRET and 
Broker-Assisting 
TRS try to deal 
with this attack 
with varying 
success. 
Orchestrated 
(ORC) 
Only partial solution to a subset 
of attacks is possible as dealing 
multiple attacks with actors 
changing roles is very difficult. 
No known solution 
for this type of 
multifaceted 
attacks. 
Reputation systems foster good behaviour, punish bad 
behaviour when it occurs, and reduces the risk of being 
harmed by others’ bad behaviour. Strengths and 
weaknesses of reputation systems are assessed qualitatively 
on the basis of their ability to convert the experience of 
buyer and seller agents into a reputation metric that 
correctly reflect the behaviour of participants and their 
capability to withstand different   type of attacks launched 
by dishonest agents. Therefore, a good reputation system 
must incorporate some inbuilt defense mechanisms to 
ensure that honest participants are rewarded with economic 
gains and cheaters are penalised with economic loss. The 
proposed strategy incorporates inbuilt defense capability in 
the reputation computation methodology itself by 
increasing its resilience against various attacks especially 
Value Imbalance and Ballot Stuffing. It also discourages 
fraudulent behaviour by slapping a higher penalty on 
dishonest sellers than the corresponding reward for honest 
behaviour. 
5. Case Study 
To illustrate the application of proposed reputation 
framework, a case study was conducted by simulating an 
electronic marketplace with four users as buyers and six 
users as sellers, i.e. B = {bi     where i = 1...4} and S = {sj   
where j = 1…6}, where B is the set of buyers and S is the 
set of sellers in the marketplace for good g. Some 
scenarios in the marketplace are shown below. 
Scenario 1: A situation was investigated where buyer b3 
wanted to buy a good g. The sellers s1 to s6 were known to 
buyer b3, although only three sellers were in its overall 
reputed list i.e.  = {sj where j = 3,4,5}. Further, 
=0.45, =0.15, e = 1.01,  α incremental rate of 0.01 
and β incremental rate of 0.001 per transaction. Based on 
buyer b3’s experience, existing overall reputation  
of each seller is depicted in Table 4. 
Table 4: Individual reputation ratings of different sellers to buyer b3 
sj s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 
 0.25 0.48 0.50 0.37 0.57 0.20 
The buyer b3 specified the pairwise importance of different 
attributes of good g i.e. of Price (P), Quality (Q), Delivery 
Period (DP) and Service Offered (SO) in linguistic terms. 
Their equivalent fuzzy values based on the fuzzy scale of 
Fig. 2 are shown as Fuzzy Pairwise Matrix (  ) in (26). 
 
The average of the weights in the previous transactions 
were = (0.0405,0.115,0.115,0.2435), = 
(0.11,0.46,0.46,0.87),  = (0.074,0.196,0.196,0.443) 
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and, = (0.0875,0.367,0.367,0.718). Hence, SW , EW, 
and W of different attributes of the good g as computed in 
MATLAB with δ = 0.27 are illustrated in Fig. 5 below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5  Overall weight computation of attributes  of good g by buyer b 
 
Sellers s1, s3, s4, s6, responded to sell good g to buyer b1. 
Now, buyer b1 computed the expected value of the product 
being offered by the four sellers as explained below.  
After taking buyers’ assessment of each seller’s product 
offer for the attributes Price (P), Quality (Q), Delivery 
Period (DP) and Service Offered (SO) in linguistic terms, 
the equivalent fuzzy performance matrix  representing 
fuzzy performance of various sellers’ offer for good g is 
shown in (27). 
 
Using (11),   was computed as,   and 
after defuzzifying the resultant crisp expected value (CVS) 
representing the expected value of good g for each seller  
,  as computed using MATLAB is 
illustrated in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6  Fuzzy (FVS) and Crisp (CVS) values of Sellers’ offers 
Based on Fig. 6, seller with the highest expected value 
of the good g as 12.2319 is selected by buyer b3 for 
purchase.  Also, as buyer b3 had 79 previous transactions 
with the seller s5, therefore α = 0.79 and β = 0.079. The 
price of good g  by seller s5 was 1500, so x = 1500. After 
purchasing, and receiving the good g, buyer b3 computed 
the actual value of the good g by again using step 2, Phase 
I of Section 3 as   = 13.346. 
Using (12),     ∆ = 13.146-12.2319 = 0.9141 > 0.        (28)                            
As ∆ > 0, buyer b3 incremented the individual   reputation 
of seller s5  as shown below.  
     = 1 – (1.01) -0.001*1500 = 0.014815    (29)                          
and  μ =    = 0.01373                        (30) 
Using (13), =0.57+0.01373*(1-0.57)=0.576.  (31)                      
The aggregated shared reputation value for seller s5 was 
0.56. Therefore, b3 computed overall rating of seller s5 by 
combining  with  using Eq. (18) as: 
  = 0.79*0.576+(1-0.79)*0.56 = 0.572.      (32)  
Scenario 2: Another situation was investigated where buyer 
b2 wanted to buy good g. Sellers s1 to s4 and s6 were known 
to buyer b2, whereas sellers s3 and s6 were in its overall 
reputed list, i.e. 
 
= {sj   where j = 3,6}. Moreover, 
=0.5, =0.25, γ = 3, e = 1.01, α incremental rate of 
0.01 per transaction and β incremental rate of 0.001 per 
transaction. After previous transaction of buyer b2, overall 
reputation ratings  for each seller are given in 
Table 5.  
Table 5:  Reputation ratings of different sellers in buyer b2’s memory 
sj s1 s2 s3 s4 s6 
  0.312 0.43 0.51 0.39 0.53 
Using step 2, Phase I of section 3, the expected value of 
the good g equivalent to 11.65 was computed to be the 
maximum for seller s3 so the buyer b2 chose seller s3 to buy 
good g. Also, buyer b2 had 45 previous transactions with 
the seller s3, therefore α = 0.45 and β = 0.045. As seller s3 
offered the good g at a price of 6750, so x = 6750. After 
purchasing, by again using step 2 of Phase I, buyer b2 
computed the actual value of good g, i.e.  as 
10.87.  
Using (12),    ∆  =  10.87 – 11.65 = - 0.78 < 0.           (33)                        
As ∆ < 0, buyer b2 decremented the individual reputation  
of seller s5 as shown below. 
     = 1 – (1.01) -0.001*6750 = 0.064959    (34)                       
 ξ =  γ   =  0.18649              (35)                                    
Using (16), =0.51-0.18649(1-0.51))=0.4186.  (36)                         
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Further, the aggregated shared reputation value for seller s3 
was 0.54. Therefore, b2 finally computed overall rating of 
seller s3 by combining its individual rating of s3 with 
 using Eq. (18) as shown below in Eq. (37). 
 =0.45* 0.41862 + (1- 0.45)*0.54=0.4854   (37)  
Scenario 3: In another case involving Ballot Stuffing 
attack, buyer b4 needed a good g. The sellers s1 to s6 were 
known to buyer b3 where s1, s2 and s4 are in its reputed list. 
Further, =0.4, =0.18, e = 1.01, α incremental rate of 
0.01 and β incremental rate of 0.001 per transaction. A 
number of successive transactions between the buyer b4 
and seller s2 were observed where Ballot Stuffing attack 
was launched on buyer b4 after 20, 50, 75, 95 and 100 
transactions between buyer b4 and seller s2. It was seen that 
the increase in reputation due to BS reduced with the 
increase in number of transactions as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Effect of BS reduces with increase in number of        
transactions between buyer b4 and seller s2 
 
Number 
of Tran-
sactions 
Value 
of Tran-
saction 
   
Effect of 
BS in %  
Change of  
Reputation 
0.47 20 12000 0.528 0.94 0.858 62.29 
0.44 50 1500 0.448 0.93 0.689 53.83 
0.48 75 5300 0.505 0.95 0.616 22.01 
0.51 95 3000 0.523 0.94 0.565 3.98 
0.46 100 2700 0.473 0.95 0.473 0 
 
It was also observed that the effect of Badmouthing would 
also be reduced due to reduced weightage of shared 
reputation with the increase in transactional experience of 
a buyer-seller pair. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper proposed a framework for a dynamic reputation 
system that is sensitive to the changing parameters of e-
market environment like experience of agents and the 
value of a transaction in e-market environment. The 
proposed system has improved inbuilt defense mechanisms 
against various attacks especially against Ballot Stuffing 
and Value Imbalance. In this framework, increase in 
transactional experience leads to increased weightage of 
individual reputation and honesty in a large transaction 
leads to a greater increase in reputation as compared to a 
small transaction. Further, non-satisfactory or fraudulent 
sellers are penalized with relatively large drop of 
reputation resulting into reduced future business 
opportunities. The proposed framework makes judicious 
use of information sharing by adapting to the changing e-
market environment. 
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